Power of Translation of QS. Al-Mâ’idah 51 on the Conservative Islamic Website in Indonesia

Daya Terjemah QS. Al-Maidah 51 di Website Islam Konservatif di Indonesia

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Abstract

This article aims to discover the translation of the word auliya’ in QS. Al-Mâ’idah Verse 51 on a conservative Islamic website in Indonesia. In addition, to find out the power and discursive practice of the verse and uncover ideology in social practice. The study was qualitative research that used the text published on Portal-islam.id and Voa-islam.com as the primary source. In data analysis, the study applied Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis. The study showed that Portal-islam.id and Voa-islam.com translated the word auliya’ as leaders. That is motivated by Hamka’s interpretation which prioritizes meaning compared to the reason for the revelation of the verse. For this understanding, conservative Islamic websites produce articles that support the prohibition of non-Muslims from becoming leaders.

Keywords: auliya’, al-Mâ’idah, Portal-islam.id, Voa-islam.com, critical discourse analysis

Abstract


Kata Kunci: auliya’, al-Mâ’idah, Portal-islam.id, Voa-islam.com, analisis wacana kritis
INTRODUCTION
In the era of online media, translations of Al-Qur’an are easy to find. It can even cut the relation (meaning) of the Al-Qur’an as revealed by Lukman (2019) that the transmission of meaning (Al-Qur’an), which initially took place in a communal intellectual environment, turned into a more intimate and personal interaction. The marriage between translation and social media has brought the meaning of the Qur’an to even the most private spaces. Even though the Al-Qur’an is a sacred holy book, some people use it as a legitimate tool for various interests, especially political issues. In the end, online media is used to spread religious messages.

The politicization of Al-Qur’an verses often occurs, not only in the verses but accompanied by a free translation. A few years ago, in 2016, to be precise, before the election for the Governor of DKI Jakarta, Ahok’s remarks went viral regarding the letter Al-Mâ’idah Verse 51. Ahok’s viral remarks were due to the progress of the information system, which was extremely fast and easy to access. Anyone can access information from anywhere without any restrictions. Even the internet encourages someone to be more creative in publishing information (Ats Tsaqofi, Subuki, and Zamhari 2022). Based on this fact, a person will easily access information, both religious, social, and political-economic.

As we know, the study of the politicization of religion has only been limited to the variety of religious ideologies used in the power struggle process. Various political ideologies are discussed from historical aspects to their implementation in political phenomena in Indonesia, so the politicization of religion is a phenomenon that needs to be watched. The role of religious characters through the language of the Al-Qur’an in constructing the phenomenon of religious politicization tends to be ignored in previous studies. The study of the politicization of religion, as described by Makinuddin (2021). First, research conducted by (Ibad 2010), al Qurtuby (2018), and Darajat (2019) examines the history of the politicization of religion which is specifically related to the use of religious elements in politics that occurred in the classical era. Second, the study conducted by Muzakki (2014), Shofan (2018), and (Mukhtar 2021) looks at the politicization of religion in the aspect of ideology, so the politicization of religious movements needs to be watched out. Third, Rachmaria (2020) explains various phenomena of the politicization of religion that have occurred in Indonesia.

According to Alûsî, as cited by Fadal & Heriyanto (2020), translating the Al-Qur’an is the same as interpreting, namely that the messages of the Al-Qur’an can be understood for the public. The translation of verses tends not to be a problem, but verses that are polemic in nature can cause problems because of the ideology of a translator (Khosravi and Pourmohammadi 2016). It means that the power of translators cannot be avoided, especially with the existence of online media, which has contributed to the discourse on the politicization of verses, especially before and during the regional head elections until the presidential election. Because it serves as a propaganda tool, this can be done by all groups, from fundamentalists, liberals, and moderate groups. As Bunt (2003, 4) said, the rise of internet users (in this case, online media) can carry out propaganda and form identities, either a person or a group of Muslims. From this, we can be understood that the translation of Al-Qur’an in online media, especially political verses, can construct an understanding of the verses of Al-Qur’an in the public sphere. Therefore, to reveal this power and ideology, this study will focus on political verses, in this case, Al-Mâ’idah verse 51 concerning non-Muslim leadership, which often creates problems in the public sphere, sometimes giving rise to narratives of hatred and negative campaigns. It is used by conservative
Islamic websites, which are represented by *Portal-islam.id* and *Voa-islam.com*. These two Islamic websites are popular among Muslims, especially in 2017, including the top 3 Islamic websites as quoted (Mujibuddin and Riza 2022) from Alexa.com and Similarweb.com. So that the influence on the public is relatively strong, it is essential to discuss the word *auliyā’* QS. Al-Mâ’idah verse 51 translated by *Portal-islam.id* and *Voa-islam.com*? How are the power and discursive practice of the translation of the verse? Furthermore, how is the social practice?

**RESEARCH METHODS**

This study uses a qualitative approach and data sources used are conservative Islamic websites, *portal-islam.id* and *voa-islam.com* which focus on Al-Ma’idah 51 which are produced and distributed on these websites.

This study uses critical discourse analysis (CDA) developed by Fairclough (2003, 2013a, 2013b) which is text-oriented discourse analysis and which seeks to bring together three traditions, namely detailed textual analysis in linguistics, the macro-sociological analysis tradition of the theory of social practice, and the interpretive and micro-sociological traditions (including ethnomethodology and conversational analysis). In his research model, Fairclough also presents three data analysis frameworks that can be used to examine the relationship between discourse and social conditions. The three analytical frameworks mentioned by Fairclough (2003, 2013a, 2013b) are 1) text description through linguistic analysis; 2) interpretation of the relationship between the text and the process of producing, distributing, and consuming texts; and 3) explanation/explanation of the relationship between discourse and the broader social context or social practice.

In this study, the text is translated text. Fairclough in analyzing linguistic problems can be simplified into diction problems. Keraf (2009) states that diction or choice of words is appropriate or not in the use of certain words, phrases, or clauses to deal with specific situations. The second part will discuss the use of the translated text for their respective interests so that discourse is created. This discourse cannot be seen as usual and neutral but as a power struggle. Forms of knowledge that can be considered authoritative discourse are the effects of power, which cannot be separated from machines that can control whether knowledge is authoritative. The distinction between right and wrong is related to scientific devices that produce knowledge through truth rites, namely through an empirical basis legitimized as the truth of that knowledge Kamahi (2017). It means there is an interest in the text. Why is produced and distributed until consumed by the general public, referred to as the discursive practice. The third discussion concerns social practices related to the context outside the text. This context influences how the discourse appears in the text. There are three levels of discourse in the social practice dimension, namely the situational, institutional, and social levels.

**RESULT AND DISCUSSION**

We know that Al-Mâ’idah Verse 51 specifically underlies adherents of Islam in Indonesia and has diverse views in addressing the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. Understandably one of the results of the many Islamic organizations that have developed in Indonesia. This heterogeneity is even more apparent when viewed from the perspective of the media, especially those with Islamic affiliations. The incident that occurred during the 2017 DKI Jakarta regional election procession, which brought together the pair Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok)-Djarot Syaiful Hidayat and Anies Baswedan-Sandiaga Uno, became one of the roots of the
increasingly heated discourse of Muslim and non-Muslim leaders, especially among the media and Islamic websites in Indonesia.

On QS. Al-Mâ’idah verse 51, there is one word that is very important but unclear in meaning to be understood, namely the word *auliyā’*. Because the word has many meanings (polysemic), for example, in the al-M’ânî Dictionary, the entry *auliyā’* is defined as *friends, lovers, (being) protectors, protectors, leaders, helpers, guardians*, and others. Shihab (2019, pp. 10–11) expressed that this word is the plural form of *waliy*, which is the same as the word *al-walá’* or *al-muwálah*. All of them have the same basic meaning, namely *closeness*. It can be comprehensively revealed by studying power and ideology in translating Al-Qur’an in online media.

Saeed (2006, p. 137) states that the verse contains instructional values. Command values, in this case, consist of commands (*amr*) and prohibitions (*lā*), so there is no need to argue that this verse is a prohibition order to make Jews and Christians become loyal friends, comrades, allies, or leaders. It depends on the understanding of the meaning of the *auliyâ’*.

To shorten it after being traced, the translation of the word *auliyā’* in QS was found. Al-Mâ’idah verse 51 contained on conservative Islamic websites, Portal-islam.id and Voa-islam.com are as follows:

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... *Janganlah kamu mengambil orang-orang Yahudi dan Nasrani menjadi pemimpin-pemimpin (mu) ...* (portal-islam.id 2016c; voa-islam.com 2016b)

... *Do not take Jews and Christians as (your) leaders ...*

On the conservative Islamic website above, the translation of the word *auliyā’* as the leader. This is inseparable from Hamka’s understanding in his *Tafsir Al-Azhar*. Hamka tries to combine reason and history to bring his interpretation to life. In addition, he referred to several books of commentary, including *Tafsir al-Manâr*, *Tafsîr al-Marâghî*, *Tafsîr fi Zhilâl al-Qur’ân*, and several other commentaries. The prohibition of Muslims made Jews and Christians leaders in the interest of protecting Muslims. From that argument, Hamka describes the bitter historical experiences faced by Muslims in Indonesia and other parts of the Islamic world (Hamka, n.d., 3:1761–65). In addition, Hamka stated, as cited by (Shihab 2019, 136), that what is considered interesting in the meaning and message of the verse is the general *lafaz*, not the specific reason (background of the verse *asbab al-nuzûl*). Thus, translating the word *auliyā’* with the leader ultimately influenced Hamka’s interpretation of the prohibition against making non-Muslims the leaders and rulers of the Indonesian government. As stated by (Matswah, 2017), Hamka’s understanding became a reference for the translation of Al-Mâ’idah verse 51 in Indonesia, which triggered the pros and cons of non-Muslim leadership in Indonesia. However, Hamka allows Muslims and non-Muslims in economic or social matters (Hamka, n.d., 3:1761–65).

Not only Hamka, but the earlier editions of *Al-Quran dan Terejamahnya* published by Ministry of Religious Affairs also translated the word *auliyā’* with ‘*pemimpin-pemimpin*’ (leaders). Moreover, A. Hassan and Mahmud Yunus both chose to translate *auliyā’* as leaders. As explained by Lukman (2022, pp. 240–241), this translation implies that the verse is understood to negate the possibility of non-Muslim leadership in Indonesia, a position that directly contradicts the constitution. Accordingly, this verse has been constantly employed in the political arena in
Indonesia in order to prevent non-Muslims from occupying significant political positions. Nevertheless, Ministry of Religious Affairs changed, and the committees opted for ‘teman setia’ (loyal friend) in the third and fourth editions.

From the explanation above, it is clear that the word *auliyâ’* has many meanings. Scholars translated with ‘leaders’ in the early days of Indonesia’s independence. It is inseparable from the colonial period. However, entering the reformation era, the word *auliyâ’* is translated as ‘loyal friend’. We must realize that, however, Portal-islam.id and Voa-islam.com translate the word *auliyâ’* as ‘leaders’ to influence the recipient of the message to change attitudes and actions, that is not allowed to elect Ahok-Djarot as governor of DKI Jakarta.

After looking at the linguistic dimension, it is time for us to examine the power and discursive practice of the translation above. It has been explained that power here can be understood as a tool to organize, control, and build categories and define and make propositions based on knowledge (Narwaya, 2021, p. 181). Understanding the translation of the word *auliyâ’* has implications for the discourses displayed by Islamic websites. Because knowledge is created and formulated by humans for interest, it is closely related to discursive practice, namely the production, consumption, and distribution of texts. However, this discussion will only discuss the production of discourse on the power of Al-Mâ’idah verse 51. As stated earlier, that understanding Al-Mâ’idah verse 51 has implications for the discourse that will be produced and distributed by each website.

Based on raw data traced from the Portal-islam.id found many articles containing Al-Mâ’idah verse 51 including:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indonesian</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Buya Hamka Tidak Membodohi Kita</td>
<td>a) Buya Hamka Didn’t Fool Us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) 5 Pukulan Telak Ketua MUI Terhadap Ahok dan Tim Hukumnya</td>
<td>b) 5 major blows from the head of the MUI against Ahok and his legal team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Keputusan Muktamar NU: Haram Hukumnya Memilih Pemimpin Non-Muslim</td>
<td>c) NU congress decision: It is illegal to vote for non-Muslim leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Ajak Umat Islam Tinggalkan Surat Al-Mâ’idah 51 Dalam Memilih Pemimpin, Ahok Dilaporkan ke Bawaslu</td>
<td>d) Inviting Muslims to Leave Al-Mâ’idah 51 in Choosing Leaders, Ahok Reported to Bawaslu</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) NU-Muhammadiyah Tegaskan Ahok Nistakan Agama</td>
<td>e) NU-Muhammadiyah Affirm Ahok Blasphemes Religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Buya Yahya: Memilih Pemimpin Non-Muslim Haram Hukumnya, Mengajaknya Lebih Haram Lagi</td>
<td>f) Buya Yahya: Choosing a non-Muslim leader is illegal; inviting him is even more illegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) AHOK TAMAT! Sikap Final MUI: Basuki Tjahaja Purnama Telah Menghina Al-Quran dan Ulama</td>
<td>g) AHOK END! MUI Final Position: Basuki Tjahaja Purnama Has Insulted Al-Quran and Ulama</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>h) Keberpihakan Kepada Pemimpin Kafir, Benci Kepada Pemimpin Muslim</td>
<td>h) Aligning with Kafir Leaders, Hating Muslim Leaders</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>i) [Hikmah Dibalik Peristiwa] Al Maidah Ayat 51 Bikin Penasaran, No. 1 di Google Trends</td>
<td>i) [The Wisdom Behind the Event] Al Maidah Verse 51 Makes Curious, No. 1 on Google Trends</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>j) Tanggapan Atas Nota Keberatan</td>
<td>j) Response to Ahok’s Note of Objection:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
From some articles produced by *Portal-islam.id*, it is clear that the website manager does not want non-Muslims (Ahok) to be governors of DKI. There are still many articles concerning Al-Mâ’idah verse 51. However, to shorten the discussion, only a few are taken, for example, the article *Buya Hamka Tidak Membodohi Kita*, *Portal-islam.id* cited Hamka’s *Tafsir*,

> “Untuk memperteguh disiplin, menyisihkan mana kawan mana lawan, maka kepada orang yang beriman diperingatkan: "Wahai orang-orang yang beriman! Janganlah kamu mengambil orang Yahudi dan Nasrani menjadi pemimpin-pemimpin." (portal-islam.id 2016a)

> “To strengthen discipline, to set aside friends and foes, the believers are warned: *O you who believe! Do not take Jews and Christians as leaders.*”

Hamka also explained how Muslims always come second when led by non-Muslims, as during the colonial period in Indonesia. Furthermore, those who want to become Jewish and Christian leaders have none other than a sick person in their hearts. The disease is hypocrisy. Apart from the disease of hypocrisy, they consider religion to be just a name. For them, it does not matter whether the leader is Muslim, Jewish, or Christian as long as there is social and life security. When Ahok’s statements were made in the Pulau Seribu, it was only natural for *Portal-islam.id* to write the article *Buya Hamka Tidak Membodohi Kita*. A narrative counter to what Ahok stated, that you should not be fooled by Al-Mâ’idah Verse 51.

To further strengthen the argument, *Portal-islam.id* produced articles related to Bahtsul Masa’il al-Diniyah al-Waqi’iyyah NU at the Lirboyo Islamic Boarding School in 1999 which forbade electing non-Muslims as leaders except in emergencies. The article is entitled *Keputusan Muktamar NU: Haram Memilih Pemimpin Non-Muslim*. In this article, *Portal-islam.id* quotes Ma’ruf Amin’s statement from the Republika.co.id website, as Chairman of the MUI:

> “Sepanjang ada calon yang Muslim dan insya Allah adil wajib hukumnya memilih calon pemimpin Muslim tersebut” (portal-islam.id 2017)
“As long as there is a Muslim candidate and insya Allah, it is fair, it is obligatory to elect the Muslim leader candidate.”

In the article, it was explained that the basis used by Ma’ruf Amin for the prohibition/illegality of voting for non-Muslims was related to the decision of the NU XXX Congress which expressly forbade electing non-Muslims as leaders except in emergencies. Furthermore, Ma’ruf Amin, in his appeal, said that there was no emergency in the Jakarta Pilkada (Regional General/Governor Election) case to the point where Muslims were not allowed to vote for non-Muslim candidates. Ma’ruf Amin emphasized that as long as there are still candidates from the Muslim community, Muslims must vote for these candidates.

In addition, an article entitled Buya Yahya: Memilih Pemimpin Non-Muslim Haram Hukumnya, Mengajaknya Lebih Haram Lagi. Buya Yahya said that it is forbidden to elect a non-Muslim leader in Islamic law.

“Memilih pemimpin non muslim di dalam Islam adalah haram. Menjerumuskan orang itu lebih haram lagi. Memilih saja sudah haram apalagi membawa dan mengajari orang untuk memilih yang haram” (portal-islam.id 2016b)

“Electing a non-Muslim leader in Islam is haram. It is even more haram to mislead people. Just choosing is haram, let alone bringing and teaching people to choose what is illegitimate.”

From the text shown above, it can be understood that as a Muslim, it is not permissible to choose non-Muslims as leaders. Moreover, inviting other people to vote for non-Muslims is even more unlawful.

Likewise, Voa-islam.com, producing a similar article, does not want non-Muslims to be leaders. It is motivated by the translation and understanding of the QS. Al-Mâ’idah 51. Based on search data from the Voa-islam.com website, 615 articles were found, including:

Table 1: Data samples of Al-Mâ’idah 51 produced by Voa-islam.com

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indonesian</th>
<th>English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a) Dewan Da’wah: Nonmuslim, Ahok Tidak Memiliki Kapasitas Menafsirkan Al Maidah Ayat 51</td>
<td>a) Dewan Da’wah: Non-Muslim, Ahok Does Not Have Capacity to Interpret Al Maidah Verse 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b) Waspada 183 Caleg PDIP Non-Muslim, Caleg Muslim Banyak dari JIL dan Syiah</td>
<td>b) Beware of 183 Non-Muslim PDIP Candidates, Many Muslim Candidates are from (Liberal Islam Network) JIL and Shia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c) Catat, Hasil Survey NCID Membuktikan Pemilih Non-Muslim Dominan Dukung Ahok</td>
<td>c) Note, NCID survey results prove that non-Muslim voters are dominant in supporting Ahok</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d) Tafsir Al Maidah 51 Menurut Imam Fakhruddin Ar Razi</td>
<td>d) Interpretation of Al Maidah 51 According to Imam Fakhruddin Ar Razi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e) Sekali Lagi, Memilih Pemimpin Non-Muslim Haram (Bagian 1)</td>
<td>e) Once Again, Voting for Non-Muslim Leaders is Haram (Part 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f) Sekali Lagi, Memilih Pemimpin Non-Muslim Haram (Bagian 2)</td>
<td>f) Once Again, Voting for Non-Muslim Leaders is Haram (Part 2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>g) Sekali Lagi, Memilih Pemimpin Non-Muslim Haram (Bagian 3 Selesai)</td>
<td>g) Once Again, Voting for Non-Muslim Leaders is Haram (Part 3 the end)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Like Portal-islam.id, Voa-islam.com also discusses the law on electing non-Muslim leaders. As explained in the previous sub-sections, the origin of the discussion on non-Muslim leadership in Indonesia was motivated by Ahok’s statement in Pulau Seribu.

The raw data above is only a few that will be analyzed, such as the articles obtained, for example, Sekali Lagi, Memilih Pemimpin Non-Muslim Haram (Bagian 1) (Dafa 2017b) to Sekali Lagi, Memilih Pemimpin Non-Muslim Haram (Bagian 3 Selesai) (Dafa 2017a). From this, it is clear that Voa-islam.com pays more attention to the prohibition of non-Muslims being leaders. The article discusses various non-Muslim leadership discourses. For example, the article Sekali Lagi, Memilih Pemimpin Non-Muslim Haram (Bagian 1) (Dafa 2017b) presents the results of Bahtsul Masa’il GP Ansor, who allowed non-Muslims to become leaders. However, to counter the narrative, Voa-islam.com displays the rejection of PP Al-Anwar Sarang under K.H. Maimoen Zubair, stating that PP-Anwar did not participate and was not responsible for the world and the hereafter for the decisions made by GP Ansor. In addition, Voa-islam.com displays the results of the XXX NU Congress, which forbids Muslims from choosing leaders from non-Muslims.

The article, Pernyataan Resmi MUI: Ahok Menghina al-Qur’an dan Ulama (voa-islam.com 2016a) stated that Ahok’s statement that Muslims had been lied to by Surah Al-Mâ’idah verse 51 was blasphemy. According to MUI, al-Qur’an Al-Mâ’idah verse 51 prohibits making Jews and Christian leaders. This verse is one of the arguments denying making non-Muslims elect leaders.

“... pernyataan Basuki Tjahaja Purnama dikategorikan ... menghina al-Qur’an dan atau menghina ulama yang memiliki konsekuensi hukum” (voa-islam.com 2016a)
“... Basuki Tjahaja Purnama’s statement is categorized ... insulting the Qur’an and/or insulting scholars, which has legal consequences.”

The text above states that Ahok has tarnished Islam. Where Ahok stated that the content of Al-Mâ’idah verse 51 prohibits making Jews and Christians leaders is a lie. Even though many Muslims believe that QS. Al-Mâ’idah 51 is a ban on making non-Muslim leaders. Several groups even reported Ahok to the police on ‘religious blasphemy’ charges and demanded that Ahok be tried and jailed (Hidayatullah 2021).

In addition to the discourse on non-Muslim leadership, Voa-islam.com also focuses on highlighting the involvement of non-Muslims in the stock exchange for legislative candidates, regional head candidates, and their presence in Islamic parties and major media in Indonesia. The article Waspada 183 Caleg PDIP Non-Muslim, Caleg Muslim Banyak dari JIL dan Syiah (voa-islam.com 2014), explicitly warns Muslim voters to be more careful in their choices in the legislative elections. What is interesting about this article is that apart from providing data on non-Muslim candidates from all regions, it also highlights the presence of candidates from the Liberal Islam Network (JIL) and Shia congregations, both Muslim. The order is wary of these two Muslim groups because both are considered dangerous in destroying the aqidah (belief) of the Ummah as non-Muslims. Many articles highlight this case in regional head elections, especially the Pilkada of Jakarta and Solo. In the case of the Jakarta Pilkada, where active voters in DKI are very heterogeneous in terms of religion, culture, race, and ethnicity, the reason for absolute Muslim candidates is not a must. However, this case became crowded due to the statement one of the candidate pairs, which resulted in the anger of Muslims from Jakarta and various regions throughout Indonesia.

Actually, in the context of QS. Al-Mâ’idah 51, some scholars have different opinions, as expressed by Lukman (2022), the idea that the rendering of auliyâ’ as ‘pemimpin-pemimpin’ is a reflection of colonial history makes sense. Still, it is only a part of the story. The translations produced during the colonial period rendered the word auliyâ’ as ‘leaders.’ It is also true that the memory of colonialism remained a determining factor in the preferences of later translators. The translation of auliyâ’ as ‘teman setia’ (‘loyal friend’) would contradict the program of multicultural inclusivity by effectively telling Muslims not to associate with Christians and would lead to social tensions.

By looking at the articles produced by the two Islamic websites, it can be understood that the two Islamic websites above can be categorized as conservative. According to Lord Hugh Cecil, as quoted by Rodner (1988), conservatism is a tendency of the human mind, a disposition that resists change. The refusal arises from a distrust of the unknown and a person’s dependence on the understanding that is following his experience rather than from theoretical reasoning. In Islam, Islamic conservatism is interpreted as a textual view of Islam and uses little rational reason in understanding religious teachings.

In the realm of distribution, we can assume that what is done by Portal-islam.id and Voa-islam.com based on what was stated earlier, is trying to take a stand against understanding QS. Al-Mâ’idah 51. With a religious justification that is more or less the same as the understanding of the colonial era, Portal-islam.id and Voa-islam.com try to present the framing that a Muslim haram (cannot) choose a non-Muslim as a leader.

It has been stated previously that the dimensions of social practice are related to things outside the text that have a relationship with the text, namely context. This context influences how discourses on discursive practice analysis appear in texts or
are published on conservative Islamic websites. There are three levels in the dimension of discourse social practice, namely the situational level, institutional level, and social level. These three dimensions help Fairclough (2003, 2013a, 2013b) operationalize Foucault’s informed statements about the constitutive social properties of discourse. Such conceptualization of discourse emphasizes the determination and interrelationships between the part and the whole at the micro and macro levels, which helps frame the ideological process because discourse can be seen in processes and changes in hegemony.

The situational level of conservative Islamic websites, both Portal-islam.id and Voa-islam.com, the discourses displayed regarding al-Mâ’idah verse 51 seem to need to be analyzed with the context of the events that lie behind this. Because every text is different. Normatively, maybe Portal-islam.id and Voa-islam.com still want to maintain the auliya’ translation with the leader. This can be seen in determining his political stance. Therefore, even though it is very likely that there is a political element in these discourses, we still have to appreciate the efforts of Portal-islam.id and Voa-islam.com to contribute to the celebration of democracy in this country.

At the institutional level, it must be understood that every text is tied to the institution that gave birth to it so that it can be understood that every text contains certain ideological interests. It is easy to understand that Portal-islam.id and Voa-islam.com are religious websites that are close to conservative Islamic groups. Therefore, it is very easy to understand that the discourses of Portal-islam.id and Voa-islam.com issues are very close to Anis-Sandi’s supporters in the same way. We must understand that the DKI Jakarta Governor Election (Pilkada) is part of seizing power.

Finally, a text must be understood at the social level, for example, in relation to a particular cultural system. That is, the social aspect is related to the macro context in society, for example, the political system, economic system, and/or the cultural system of society as a whole. It has been stated previously that the political system adopted in Indonesia is not Islamic. Every citizen has the right to nominate a leader in Indonesia. Religious justification for the issue of the prohibition of non-Muslims as leaders is still much debated, as presented by multicultural Islamic websites. Because democracy does not allow restrictions on rights, including the right to be elected, with this position, it is very natural that many parties accuse the discourses displayed on this conservative Islamic website are aimed at boosting the votes of one of the candidate pairs. So, is it forbidden for us Muslims to make Jews and Christians a leader?

It is prohibited if it is suspected that the person concerned is hostile to Islam. There are even leaders who have unlimited authority, in other words, authoritarian with unchecked power, so obviously, Muslims cannot be made auliya’. However, if there are Muslims who meet the requirements, it is not permissible to prioritize non-Muslims to become leaders over Muslims. In line with what was said by Shihab (2019, p. 194), that needs to be underlined that it is not permissible to appoint someone who claims to be Muslim but whose thoughts and behavior are not in line with religious values or who does not fight for the interests of the general public.

Al-Mawardi in Al-Ahkamus Sulthoniyah, as quoted by Kurniawan (2015), power is divided at least into two, tafwidth (officials with regulatory, legislative, judicial, and other authorities) and tanfidz (executive). Tafwidth powers have the scope of work handling laws and analyzing various injustices, mobilizing soldiers and managing war strategies, and managing budgets, regulations, and legislation. For tafwidth officials, Al-Mawardi requires Islam, an understanding of religious law, and independence. At
the same time, the power of *tanfidz* includes implementing regulations made and drafted by *tafvidh* officials. There are no Islamic requirements, and they are pious in religious matters and independent. In our opinion, electing executive officials such as governors, mayors, regents, sub-district heads, *lurah*, or RW and RT heads from among non-Muslims is possible in the Indonesian context because the *tanfidz* officials are only executors of the 1945 Constitution (UUD) and its derivative laws.

In the Indonesian context, non-Muslim leaders cannot make policies at will to support their disbelief because they must comply with the constitution and other derivative laws. Non-Muslim leaders also have limited power. Power in Indonesia has been divided between the legislature and the judiciary outside the executive. So that the leader’s performance remains monitored and on the path of the constitution that has been agreed upon by the people’s representatives, they seem only as a bridge between the people and the constitution. Apart from that, before becoming leaders, they have gone through the mechanism of candidate selection, strict screening and KPU verification. They also took the oath of office before being sworn in. In this case, we are more inclined to agree with Al-Mawardi’s opinion that it is permissible for non-Muslims to occupy executive positions. It is where the wisdom of Islamic law.

**CONCLUSION**

From the data obtained, that conservative Islamic websites represented by *Portal-islam.id* and *Voa-islam.com* were successfully processed, it can be concluded how the results are translated, that conservative Islamic websites translate the word *auliyâ* as leaders. It is motivated by Hamka’s interpretation which prioritizes meaning compared to the reason for the revelation of the verse. There are many interpretations of prohibition in this verse. For example, Abû Zahrah, as cited by Shihab (2019, pp. 193–194) that the prohibition on this verse is *al-intimâ* (joining a group), namely the willingness to make non-Muslims as the authority handle the affairs of the Muslims in the context of *al-intimâ*.

Regarding the power over the of QS. Al-Mâ’idah verse 51 and the discursive practice, it appears that conservative Islamic websites produce articles that support the prohibition of non-Muslims from becoming leaders. It can be seen that the understanding of conservative Islamic websites that are textual and a little may use rational reasoning in understanding religious teachings. In the analysis of social practice, there is much discussion about QS. Al-Mâ’idah was motivated by Ahok’s statement in Kepulauan Seribu. Normatively, maybe *Portal-islam.id* and *Voa-islam.com* still want to maintain the *auliyâ*’ translation as the leaders. It can be seen in determining his political stance.

As revealed by Shihab (2019, pp. 200–201), two things should be underlined. First, everyone should try to find the truth and then make a choice. It means that everyone must think sincerely to find the best and then strive to become an official (leader) without being influenced by the family, group, or even temporal relations. Second, the difference is a necessity. Therefore, all differences that do not result in disputes must be accepted, and all differences that result in disputes must be rejected and prevented.

This research still contains weaknesses, so it needs to be developed further; for example, the object of research is still minimal, with only two conservative Islamic websites; it is necessary to add more research objects.

**REFERENCES**


