

Critical Discourse Analysis on King Salman's Speeches at the United Nations General Assembly

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This study aims to reveal the ideology in King Salman's political speeches at the United Nations General Assembly. A critical qualitative design was applied in analyzing two of King Salman's speeches in 2020 and 2021. In line with the research objectives, the ideological square is used as the theoretical framework for data analysis. The results of microanalysis show that King Salman uses the basic strategy of emphasizing positive things about 'us' in 129 data (58.6%), emphasizing negative things about 'them' in 60 data (27.3%), and de-emphasizing positive things about 'them' in 31 data (14.1%). As for de-emphasizing negative things about 'us' not found in the data source. In the microanalysis dimension, among the rhetorical discursive strategies found were actor description in 77 data (35.0%), consensus in 16 data (7.3%), comparison in 6 data (2.7%), values expression in 76 data (34.5%), victimization-criminalization in 30 data (13.6%), and national self-glorification in 15 data (16.9%). Based on this analysis, the general ideologies found in King Salman's speech are nationalism and anti-imperialism. King Salman constructed Saudi Arabia's national identity in international eyes as a philanthropist, humanitarian, peace initiator, and non-violence country. These identities are then represented as the trademark of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy.

Article History

Received: 17
January 2024
Accepted: 11
October 2024
Published: 18
October 2024

Keywords

*critical discourse
analysis, ideology,
King Salman,
political speech,
United Nations*

How to cite:

Reflinaldi, Hadi, S., & Khairunnisa, A. (2024). Critical Discourse Analysis on King Salman's Speeches at the United Nations General Assembly. *Humanus: Jurnal Ilmu-Ilmu Humaniora*, 23(2), 188-208. DOI: 10.24036/humanus.v23i2.127205

Introduction

Despite being extensively used to reveal ideology in the political speeches of global leaders, critical discourse analysis (CDA) has not yet been applied to King Salman's speeches. As one of the leaders of a developed country, King Salman instrumentalized his speech to construct Saudi Arabia's identity in the international world (Reflinaldi et al., 2024; Youssef & Albarakati, 2020). In line with Kentikelenis & Voeten (2018) and Badache et al. (2022), King Salman takes advantage of crucial moments such as the United

Nations General Assembly (UN GA) to convey his country's views on various current issues. In the arguments of Baturu et al. (2017), Baturu & Dasandi (2017), and Luo (2021), King Salman's speeches at the UN GA are an important lingual phenomenon for mapping the ideological foundations of Saudi Arabia's foreign policy. This argument is strengthened by Khaled (2020) and Lafta (2020) who interpreted the ideologies of Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump through their speeches at the UN GA. Based on these studies, King Salman's speech can be positioned as a medium for representing ideology which is formed through argumentative, emotional, and diplomatic language styles (Anisimova, 2017; Jones, 2020; Jones & Clark, 2019).

As a strategic tool that represents ideology, the speeches of world leaders have been studied by many researchers. Among the speeches of popular Western leaders that have been analyzed are those of US presidents such as Bill Clinton, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. Study of Zheni (2018) concluded that Clinton presented knowledge as factual to legitimize his power. Clinton's language style is different from Obama's, which predominantly uses simple language and builds solidarity with the audience to internalize its power and ideology (Abdelaal et al., 2015; Kazemian & Hashemi, 2014; Khalil, 2021; Sharififar & Rahimi, 2015). Meanwhile, Trump, who is popular for his aggressive language style, implies anti-Islam and anti-Muslim ideology in his iconic speeches (Khan et al., 2019, 2020, 2021; Susilowati & Ulkhasanah, 2021). Ideologically, Trump is the opposite of Biden, who represents more democracy, liberalism, and humanism (Kadwa & Alshenqeeti, 2020; Rahmaida & Cahyono, 2022; Renaldo, 2021).

Ideological mapping is also often carried out in the speeches of leaders of Asian countries which in the study of Lees (2023) are said to have ideologies typical of South-South countries. Among the objects analyzed by several previous researchers is the language style of the prime ministers of Pakistan, Nawaz Shareef, and Imran Khan. In the study by Naeem et al. (2022) and Raza et al. (2022), Shareef was considered able to synergize his power and ideology smoothly through simple language. This conclusion is different from Imran Khan who is considered to represent his identity more than his collective national identity (Naeem et al., 2022; Yahya, 2020). Xi Jin Ping China's supreme leader is considered not to show paradigmatic ideological change because he predominantly represents Maoism (Klimeš & Marinelli, 2018; Luo, 2021). In Indonesia, Sukarno as the first president was positioned as a leader who had a strong ideology. Through his historical speeches, Soekarno was identified as promoting three main ideologies: unity; revolutionism; and anti-imperialism (Latupeirissa et al., 2019b, 2019a).

In the context of the Middle East, several studies have been found that reveal the ideology in speeches of King Abdullah II. King Abdullah II promoted the ideology of tolerance, peace, and anti-extremism (Al-Khawaldeh et al., 2024; Khawaldeh & Hatab, 2018). This ideology which is oriented towards creating a positive mentality is the impact of adopting Islamic values in the Jordan political system (Ebniya, 2020). Patterns of peace and anti-terror ideology are also found in King Salman's speeches about terrorism (Youssef & Albarakati, 2020). Meanwhile, different ideological characters are found in studying the speeches of Bashar Al-Assad and Hassan Rouhani. Both leaders are associated with extreme ideologies that legitimize war and violence against civilians (Matar, 2019; Sharififar & Rahimi, 2015). Ideology and political speech in the Middle East have complex study dimensions. Study of Haj Omar (2020) proves that ideological infiltration is also carried out in translation, where several media are proven to have intervened in the process of translating political speeches from the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Based on the literature review presented above, an analysis of ideology in King Salman's speeches at the UN GA will provide a new perspective amidst the dynamics of existing studies. King Salman constructed identity in his speeches through the binary opposition of "Us" and "Them". This construction can be described using Van Dijk's ideological square analysis (Van Dijk, 2006a; 2006b; 2006c). Analysis of ideology in King Salman's speeches can be formulated through the core question: what are the basic discursive strategies and rhetorical discursive strategies used in King Salman's speeches at the UN GA? Institutionally, ideological analysis will find the philosophical foundations of Saudi Arabia's alignment and policy orientation at the national and global levels (Bennett et al., 2023; Rempala et al., 2016). Meanwhile, personally, the analysis will conclude the factors that determine King Salman's emotions and cognition in his speeches (Abuín-Vences et al., 2022; Engesser et al., 2017; Mochtak et al., 2022). Thus, this study that accommodates personal-institutional ideological elements will fill the new orientation of ideological and political research as proposed by Carmines & D'Amico (2015) and Kissas (2017).

Methods

Qualitative-explanatory research was conducted on videos of King Salman's speeches published on the AlHadath YouTube channel (AlHadath الحدث - YouTube). The author took videos of King Salman's speeches at the UN GA in 2020 and 2021 as the data sources. The videos were chosen for two reasons. The first is the complexity of the content, where the speeches covered global emergency issues such as COVID-19, humanity, security, politics, society, and culture. The second is the distinction of context, where the UN GA that year was held via video conference. Details of the data sources are shown in Table 1.

Table 1

List of data sources

Code	Title of Video	Source and Link
A	كلمة العاهل السعودي الملك سلمان بن عبد العزيز أمام الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة <i>kalimah al-'āhil al-su'ūdī al-malik Salmān ibn Abd al-'Azīz amāma al-jam'iyah al-'āmmah li al-umam al-muttaḥidah</i> 'Speech of Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz before the United Nations General Assembly'	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0BSeWeQy4ms&t=44s September 23, 2020
B	كلمة العاهل السعودي الملك سلمان بن عبد العزيز في الجمعية العامة للأمم المتحدة <i>kalimah al-'āhil al-su'ūdī al-malik Salmān ibn Abd al-'Azīz amāma al-jam'iyah al-'āmmah li al-umam al-muttaḥidah</i> 'Speech of Saudi King Salman bin Abdulaziz at the United Nations General Assembly'	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tZRMj0jhrGA September 22, 2021

Research data was collected through several stages. First, transcribing oral data from King Salman's utterances at the data sources into a text-based format manually. Next, read the data to ensure the completeness of the speech narratives and the validity of the transcription. After that, the data is printed before the tabulation and classification

steps. Tabulation is then carried out by classifying the text in the form of sentences and then proceeding with labeling letters and numbers for coding the data. Finally, data grouping is based on the ideological square analysis framework. The data analysis process is also carried out in several stages. First, describe the classification of the data to identify the lingual units to be analyzed. Then sort the representative data to be described. Analysis was carried out to outline discursive strategies and identify ideologies in the data sources. Lastly, emphasize conclusions with arguments as the answer to the core research problem.

Data analysis was carried out through a CDA framework. CDA is an effective analytical tool for critically mapping qualitative communication and interpreting discourse strategies in constructing and legitimizing power (Fairclough, 2013; Muller, 2015; Reynolds, 2019). To answer the research question, the authors use the ideological square model proposed by Van Dijk (2006a, 2006b, 2006c). The ideological square explains the binary representations of self and others in discourse, where the self or in-group tends to be represented positively and other people or out-group are represented negatively. Several recent studies show that this model is suitable for use in the analysis of political discourse which represents subjective constructions based on ideological conflicts (Khan et al., 2019; Masroor et al., 2019; Rauf et al., 2019; Reynolds, 2019). Van Dijk (2006a, 2006b, 2006c) explains that the analysis stages consist of macro analysis containing four basic discursive strategies and macro analysis containing 25 rhetorical discursive strategies. The strategies that are instrumented to legitimize the self and delegitimize the other are displayed in Table 2.

Table 2

Element of macro analysis and microanalysis in ideological square model

Macro Analysis	Micro Analysis	
Basic discursive strategies	Rhetorical strategies	discursive strategies
(1) Emphasize positive things about 'us'; (2) Emphasize negative things about 'them'; (3) De-emphasize negative things about 'us'; (4) De-emphasize positive things about 'them'.	(1) Actor description; (2) Authority; (3) Burden; (4) Categorization; (5) Comparison; (6) Consensus; (7) Counterfactual; (8) Disclaimer; (9) Euphemism; (10) Evidentiality; (11) Argumentation; (12) Illustration/Example; (13) Generalization; (14) Hyperbole; (15) Implication; (16) Irony; (17) Lexicalization; (18) Metaphor; (19) National self-glorification; (20) Norm expression; (21) Number game; (22) Polarization; (23) Populism; (24) Presupposition; (25) Victimization.	

Results and Discussion

Based on data analysis, 3 basic discursive strategies and 6 rhetorical discursive strategies were found. Basic discursive strategies in the data consist of emphasize positive 'us', emphasize negative 'them', and de-emphasize positive 'them'. Meanwhile,

rhetorical discursive strategies in the data consist of actor description, consensus, comparison, values expression, victimization-criminalization, and national self-glorification. Details of the number and percentage of each strategy are shown in Table 3.

Table 3*Discursive strategies in King Salman's speeches*

No	Strategies	Emphasize Positive 'Us'		Emphasize Negative 'Them'		De-Emphasize Negative 'Us'		De-Emphasize Positive 'Them'		Total	
		N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
1	Actor Description	45	34.9	16	26.7	0	0.0	16	51.6	77	35.0
2	Consensus	16	12.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	16	7.3
3	Comparison	3	2.4	2	3.3	0	0.0	1	3.2	6	2.7
4	Values Expression	50	38.7	26	43.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	76	34.5
5	Victimization - Criminalization	0	0.0	16	26.7	0	0.0	14	45.2	30	13.6
6	National Self-Glorification	15	11.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	15	6.9
Total		129	100	60	100	0	0.0	31	100	220	100

Actor Description

Actor description is a strategy for constructing information about actors. Through this strategy, speakers explain the character, role, tendencies, and status of actors in various social and political dimensions. Actor description classifies actors into in-group that are portrayed positively and out-group that are portrayed negatively. The actors mentioned and described in King Salman's speech can be seen in Table 4.

Table 4*List of actors and their descriptions in King Salman's speeches*

No	Actors	Description	Freq.	Percent.
1	(al-mamlakah al-saudiyyah) 'Kingdom of Saudi Arabia'	Peace initiator	14	18.2%
		Anti-terrorism	8	10.4%
		Philanthropist	6	7.8%
		Humanitarian	6	7.8%
		fighter	5	6.4%
		Visionary	4	5.2%
		country	3	3.9%
		Law-abiding country		
2	'America' (al-amrikā) الأمريكية	Peace initiator	1	1.3%
3	'Yemen' (al-yaman) اليمن	Crisis country	4	5.2%

4	'Iraq' (<i>al-ir'āq</i>) العراق	Crisis country	1	1.3%
5	'Sudan' (<i>al-sūdān</i>) السودان	Crisis country	2	2.6%
6	'Egypt' (<i>miṣr</i>) مصر	Crisis country	1	1.3%
7	'Lebanon' (<i>lubnān</i>) لبنان	Crisis country	1	1.3%
8	(<i>afghānistān</i>) أفغانستان 'Afghanistan'	Crisis country	1	1.3%
9	'Libia' (<i>lībiyā</i>) ليبيا	Crisis country	2	2.6%
10	'Syria' (<i>sūriyā</i>) سوريا	Crisis country	2	2.6%
11	(<i>al-nizām al-irānī</i>) النظام الإيراني 'Iranian regime'	Terrorist	8	10.4%
12	(<i>al-milīthiyāt al-</i> الميليشيات الحوثية 'Houthi militia' <i>hūthiyah</i>)	Terrorist	6	7.8%
13	'Hezbollah' (<i>ḥizballah</i>) حزب الله	Terrorist	2	2.6%
Total			77	100%

In general, the actors in Table 4 can be grouped into positive, neutral, and negative actors. The positive actors represented in the protagonist context consist of Saudi Arabia and America, which were mentioned 47 times (61%). Neutral actors represented in the non-aligned context consist of Middle Eastern countries, namely Yemen, Sudan, Iraq, Egypt, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria, which were mentioned 14 times (18.2%). The negative actors represented in an antagonistic context consist of the Iranian regime, Houthi militia, and Hezbollah, which were mentioned 16 times (20.8%). Meanwhile, from the perspective of each actor, those most frequently mentioned were Saudi Arabia (59.7%), the Iranian regime (10.4%), and the Houthi militia (7.8%). Among the descriptions of Saudi Arabia in the data source can be seen in data A.15 and B.34 below.

A.15 إن بلادي منذ تأسيس هذه المنظمة كانت في طليعة الدول الساعية لتحقيق الأمن والسلم الدوليين.

inna bilādī mundhu ta'sīs hādhihi al-munazzamah kānat fī ṭālī'ah al-duwal al-sā'iyah li taḥqiq al-amn wa al-silm al-dawliyyīn. (Year 2020. Minutes 3:14-3:23)

'Since the founding of this organization, my country has been at the forefront of countries seeking to achieve international peace and security.'

B.34 وتؤكد المملكة على أهمية وقوف المجتمع الدولي بحزم أمام كل من يدعم ويرعى ويمول ويؤوي الجماعات الإرهابية والميليشيات الطائفية أو يستخدمها وسيلة لنشر الفوضى والدمار وبسط الهيمنة والنفوذ.

wa tuakkidu al-mamlakah 'alā ahammiyah wuqūf al-mujtama' al-dawli bi ḥazm amām kulli man yad'amu wa yar'ā wa yamūlu wa yu'wī al-jamā'āt al-irhābiyah wa al-milīthiyāt al-ṭāfiyah aw yastahdimuha wasīlah li nashr al-fawḍā wa al-dimār wa baṣṭ al-haymanah wa al-nufūdz. (Year 2021. Minutes 11:03-11:28)

'The Kingdom emphasizes the importance of the international community standing firm against anyone who supports, sponsors, finances, or harbors terrorist groups and sectarian militias, or uses

them as a means to spread chaos and destruction and extend dominance and influence.'

A.15 contains the description of Saudi Arabia as a country that always strives for international peace. Saudi Arabia's reputation for peace has been built for a long time and they have proven themselves to be a country that is always at the forefront. King Salman describes this through the clause *...mundhu ta'sīs hādhihi al-munazzamah kānat fī ṭālī'ah...* '...since the founding of this organization, [my country] has been at the forefront...' Directly proportional to A.15, description Saudi Arabia as an anti-terrorism country is included in B.34. These two data construct a congruent logic, where love of peace is in line with non-violence. The description as an anti-terrorism country is reflected in the phrase *...bi ḥazm amām kulli man yad'amu wa yar'ā wa yamūlu wa yu'wī al-jamā'at al-irhābiyah wa al-mīlithiyāt al-tā'ifiyah...* '...standing firm against anyone who supports, sponsors, finances, or harbors terrorist groups and sectarian militias...' Through B.34, King Salman also emphasized that Saudi Arabia always invites other countries to stand firmly against terrorism.

King Salman positions eight Middle Eastern countries as neutral actors. These countries are described as countries experiencing humanitarian crises due to conflict and war. These countries can be said to be neutral actors because the description of them is not in the form of characters, roles, and status that contain positive or negative values. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime and the Houthi militia are two other actors who are also widely said to be in a negative position. These two actors are represented as terrorists who undermine the peace and security stability of Yemen and intervene in conflicts in several Middle Eastern countries. King Salman's descriptions of these two actors can be seen in data A.24 and A.29 below.

A.24 واستمراراً لذلك النهج العدواني، قام النظام الإيراني العام الماضي باستهداف المنشآت النفطية في المملكة، في انتهاك صارخ للقوانين الدولية، واعتداء على الأمن والسلم الدوليين.
wa istimrār li dhālika al-nahj al-'udwānī, qāma al-nizām al-Īrānī al-'ām al-māḍī bi istihdāf al-munshiāt al-naftīyah fī al-mamlakah, fī intihāk ṣāriḥ li al-qawānīn al-dawliyah, wa i'tidā' alā al-amn wa al-silm al-dawliyyīn. (Year 2020. Minutes 6:01-6:19)

'In continuation of this aggressive approach, the Iranian regime last year targeted oil installations in the Kingdom, in flagrant violation of international laws and an attack on international peace and security.'

A.29 ...من خلال انقلاب الميليشيات الحوثية التابعة له على السلطة الشرعية أدت إلى أزمة سياسية واقتصادية وإنسانية.

...min ḥilāl inqilāb al-mīlithiyāt al-hūthiyah al-tābi'ah lahu 'alā al-sultāh al-shar'iyah addat ilā azmah siyāsīyah wa iqtisādiyyah wa insāniyah. (Year 2020. Minutes 7:35-7:42)

'...through a coup carried out by the Houthi militia against the legitimate government, causing a political, economic and humanitarian crisis.'

The Iranian regime was described as the actor who targeted attacks on Saudi Arabia's strategic infrastructure on A.24. King Salman did not describe the attack as a single act, but as a continuation of a series of terrorist actions they had previously carried out. This emphasis is found in the phrase *wa istimrār li dhālika al-nahj al-'udwānī...* 'in continuation of this aggressive approach...'. Apart from that, the description of the Iranian regime as terrorists is also strengthened through their actions that violate international law (...*fi intihāk šāriḥ li al-qawānīn al-dawliyah...*) and damage international peace and security (...*wa i'tidā' alā al-amn wa al-silm al-dawliyyīn*). The description as a terrorist also occurs with the Houthi Militia, as depicted in A.29. In his speeches, King Salman consistently represents the Houthis as an extension of Iran. This militia group carried out violent movements in Yemen. They oppose the legitimacy of the legitimate government (...*inqilāb...alā al-sultah al-shar'iyah...*) and cause political, economic and humanitarian crises (...*addat ilā azmah siyāsīyah wa iqtisādiyah wa insāniyah*).

Consensus

Consensus is a consolidation strategy that shows that one actor has agreement and understanding about something. Politically, consensus is built across institutions, organizations, or countries. Through this strategy, members who are members of the consensus are committed to their respective values and defense against external and internal threats. In his speech, King Salman indicated that Saudi Arabia had a consensus with nine organizations and countries. These organizations and countries are mentioned several times as shown in Table 5.

Table 5

List of Saudi Arabia's consensus partner organizations and countries

No	Organizations and Countries	Freq.	Percent
1	'United (al-umam al-muttaḥidah) الأمم المتحدة Nations'	4	25.0%
2	'G-20' (majmū'ah al-'ishrīn) مجموعة العشرين	3	18.9%
3	'Security Council' (majlis al-amn) مجلس الأمن	3	18.9%
4	مركز الأمم المتحدة الدولي لمكافحة الإرهاب (markaz al-umam al-muttaḥidah al-dawli li mukāfahah al-irḥāb) 'United Nations Office of Counter Terrorism'	1	6.2%
5	المركز العالمي لمكافحة الفكر المتطرف - إعتدال (al-markaz al'ālamī li mukāfahah al-fikr al-mutaṭarrif - I'tidāl) 'Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology - Etidal'	1	6.2%
6	'OPEC Plus' (Ūpīc Plus) أوبك بلس	1	6.2%
7	مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية (majlis al-ta'āwun li duwal al-khalīj al-'arabiyah) 'Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf'	1	6.2%
8	'Middle East' (al-sharq al-awsat) الشرق الأوسط	1	6.2%
9	'America' (al-amrikā) أمريكا	1	6.2%
Total		16	100%

The data in Table 5 shows that among Saudi Arabia's partners that were frequently mentioned in King Salman's speech were the United Nations, G-20, and the UN Security Council. The context of the mention of the three partners can be seen in data A.36 and B.10 below.

A.4
2 حيث دعمت المملكة مركز الأمم المتحدة الدولي لمكافحة الإرهاب، بمبلغ مئة وعشرة ملايين دولار، وانشأت المركز العالمي لمكافحة الفكر المتطرف (اعتدال)...

haythu da'amat al-mamlakah markaz al-umam al-muttaḥidah al-dawlī li mukāfaḥah al-irhāb, bi mablagh miah wa 'asharah malāyīn dūlār, wa anshaat al-markaz al-'ālamī li mukāfaḥah al-fikr al-mutaṭarrif (i'tidāl). (Year 2020. Minutes 10:25-10:38)

'The Kingdom supported the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism Center with an amount of one hundred and ten million dollars, and established the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology (Etidal)...

B.1
0 وقد قامت المملكة العربية السعودية بدور حيوي ... من خلال رئاستها لمجموعة العشرين العام الماضي.

wa qad qāmat al-mamlakah al-'arabiyah al-su'ūdiyyah bi dawr ḥayawī ... khilāl riāsatiḥā li majmu'ah al-'ishrīn al-'ām al-mādī. (Year 2021. Minutes 1:59-2:13)

'The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia played a vital role ... through its presidency of the G20 last year.'

In data A.42, King Salman explains his side with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism and the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology (Etidal). This narrative is conveyed in the context of conflict resolution in Yemen involving Saudi Arabia, the Iranian regime, and the Houthi militia. Saudi Arabia's siding with the United Nations and the Etidal is expressed through support for the decisions of these institutions. This can be seen in the clause ...*da'amat al-mamlakah markaz al-umam al-muttaḥidah al-dawlī li mukāfaḥah al-irhāb*... 'The Kingdom supported the United Nations International Counter-Terrorism Center...'. In another part, King Salman also stated that the UN special envoy to Yemen and Security Council resolution number 2216 were agreements that they seriously supported as part of the organization. Meanwhile, B.10 explained the form of Saudi Arabia's collaboration with countries that are members of the G-20. In the context of the narrative in this data, King Salman explained the efforts made by Saudi Arabia as president of the G-20 to overcome the impact of the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. He said that Saudi Arabia plays an important role in the international world through the key phrase *qāmat...bi dawr ḥayawī*... 'playing an important role'. This not only shows Saudi Arabia's membership in the organization but also the significance of the role they play.

Comparison

Comparison is a strategy for constructing gaps that emphasizes the differences between one actor, situation, event, and role with other actors. Through this strategy, two or more things are sometimes contrasted to form a binary image. Among the uses of comparison strategies can be seen in data A.16-A.17, B.24-B.25, and A.23 below.

- A.16 وعملت دوماً ولا تزال على بذل جهود الوساطة والتوصل لحلول سلمية للنزاعات... إلا أن منطقة الشرق الأوسط عانت...
-
- A.17 *wa 'amilat dawman wa lā tazāl 'alā badhl juhūd al-wasāṭah wa al-tawaṣṣul li ḥulūl silmiyah li al-nazā'āt... illā anna mantiqah al-sharq al-awsat 'ānat...* (Year 2020. Minutes 3:24-3:56)
'[The Kingdom] continues to undertake efforts to mediate and achieve peaceful solutions... However, **the Middle East region** has suffered...'
- B.24 إن مبادرة السلام في اليمن، التي قدمتها المملكة في مارس الماضي... وللأسف ما تزال ميليشيات الحوثية الإرهابية ترفض الحلول السلمية...
-
- B.25 *inna mubādarah al-salām fī al-yaman allatī qaddamathā al-mamlakah fī māris al-māḍī... wa lil asaf mā tazālu milithiyāt al-ḥūthiyah al-irḥābiyah tarfudu al-ḥulūl al-silmiyah...* (Year 2021. Minutes 7:31-7:53)
'The peace initiative in Yemen, presented by the **Kingdom of Saudi Arabia** in March... Unfortunately, the **Houthi military** still rejected a peaceful solution...'
- A.23 ورحبت بالجهود الدولية لمعالجة برنامج إيران النووي، ولكن مرة بعد أخرى رأى العالم أجمع استغلال النظام الإيراني لهذه الجهود في زيادة نشاطه التوسيعي...
wa raḥabat bi al-juhūd al-dawliyah li mu'ālajah barnāmij Īran al-nawawī, walākin marrah ba'd ukhrā raā al-'ālam ajma' istighlāl al-nizām al-Īrānī li hādhihi al-juhūd fī ziyādah nashātah al-tawsi'ī... (Year 2020. Minutes 5:30-5:45)
'**The Kingdom** welcomes international efforts to address Iran's nuclear program, but over time the entire world has seen the **Iranian regime** exploit these efforts to increase its expansionist activities...'

The three data above contain comparisons between Saudi Arabia and several Middle Eastern countries, the Houthi militia, and the Iranian regime. In all three data, Saudi Arabia is consistently represented as a country that strives for international peace. Meanwhile, the other three actors are represented in different situations and roles. The Middle East region in data A.16-A.17 is represented as countries experiencing security challenges. Based on the context of the discourse, the countries referred to by King Salman in this data are Yemen, Iraq, Sudan, Egypt, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Libya, and Syria. The situation of suffering in these countries is described through the clause *illā anna mantiqah al-sharq al-awsat 'ānat* 'however, the Middle East region has suffered...'. This situation is inversely proportional to Saudi Arabia as a country that is stable and able to move towards seeking peace on an international scale (...*wa lā tazāl 'alā badhl juhūd al-wasāṭah wa al-tawaṣṣul li ḥulūl silmiyah...*).

The same pattern is carried out in representing the Houthi militia in data B.24-B.25 and the Iranian regime in data A.23. In B.24-B.25, the Houthi militia is represented as an actor who rejects a peaceful solution to the conflict in Yemen. King Salman described their attitude through the clause *wa lil asaf mā tazālu milithiyāt al-ḥūthiyah al-irḥābiyah*

tarfudu al-ḥulūl al-silmiyah... 'Unfortunately, the Houthi military still rejected a peaceful solution...'. This attitude contrasts with Saudi Arabia's efforts to initiate peace in the previous March. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime in data A.23 is represented as a country that exploits conflict to increase expansion (*istighlāl al-niẓām al-Irānī li hādhihi al-juhūd fī ziyādah nashātah al-tawsī'i...*). The Iranian regime's activities also contradict Saudi Arabia's steps to ask for international assistance to stop Iran's nuclear program. Based on the three data displayed above, the comparative pattern constructed by King Salman regarding three actors outside Saudi Arabia can be seen in Table 6 below.

Table 6

Comparison pattern of Saudi Arabia with three other actors

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	: Striving for international peace
Middle East region	: Suffering from security challenge
Iranian regime	: Increasing expansionist activities
Houthi militia	: Rejecting peaceful solution

Values Expression

Values expression is a strategy that associates certain values with certain actors. Through these associations, actors are identified with a value that produces a positive or negative image of themselves. The results of the data analysis show that there are several values expressed in King Salman's speech. These values contain positive and negative tendencies identified with the actor. The list of values is displayed in Table 7.

Table 7

List of values expressed in King Salman's speeches

No	Values	Tendency	Freq.	Percent.
1	'peace' (<i>al-salām</i>) السلام	Positive	13	17.1%
2	'security' (<i>al-amn</i>) الأمن	Positive	11	14.4%
3	'terrorism' (<i>al-irḥābiyyah</i>) الإرهابية	Negative	11	14.4%
4	'extremism' (<i>al-taṭarruf</i>) التطرف	Negative	10	13.1%
5	'stability' (<i>al-istiqrār</i>) الاستقرار	Positive	8	10.5%
6	'prosperity' (<i>al-izdihār</i>) الإزدهار	Positive	4	5.2%
7	'humanity' (<i>al-insāniyah</i>) الإنسانية	Positive	3	4.1%
8	'sovereignty' (<i>al-siyādah</i>) السيادة	Positive	3	4.1%
9	'sectarianism' (<i>al-ṭāifiyah</i>) الطائفية	Negative	3	4.1%
10	'growth' (<i>al-numw</i>) النمو	Positive	2	2.6%
11	(<i>al-istiqlāl</i>) الإستقلال 'independence'	Positive	2	2.6%
12	'moderation' (<i>al-l'tidāl</i>) الاعتدال	Positive	1	1.3%
13	'solidarity' (<i>al-takātuf</i>) التكاتف	Positive	1	1.3%
14	'chaos' (<i>al-fawḍā</i>) الفوضى	Negative	1	1.3%
15	'hegemony' (<i>al-haymanah</i>) الهيمنة	Negative	1	1.3%
16	'tolerance' (<i>al-tasāmuḥ</i>) التسامح	Positive	1	1.3%
17	'unity' (<i>al-wiḥdah</i>) الوحدة	Positive	1	1.3%
Total			76	100%

Based on the data in Table 7, there are four dominant values expressed in King Salman's speech, namely *al-salam* 'peace' (17.1%), *al-amn* 'security' (14.4%), *al-irḥābiyah* 'terrorism' (14.4%), and *al-taṭarruf* 'extremism' (13.1%). The values of *al-salām* 'peace' and *al-amn* 'security' have a positive tendency, while the values of *al-irhabiyah* 'terrorism' and *al-tatarruf* 'extremism' have a negative tendency. In his speech, King Salman associated these values with several actors he consistently represents: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; the Middle East region; the Iranian regime; the Houthi militia; and Hezbollah. It regulates the position of actors in existing positive and negative values so that they can be associated and identified with these values. Following this strategic orientation, the position of the actors in dominant values can be seen in Table 8 below.

Table 8*Position of actors in dominant values*

Actors	Position in Dominant Values		
	Peace and Security	Terrorism and Extremism	
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia	Initiator	Anti	
Middle East region	Claimants	Violence	
Iranian regime	Destroyer	Supporter	
Houthi militia	Destroyer	Actors	
Hezbollah	Destroyer	Actors	

The analysis results in Table 8 show the framing of important actors by determining their position in the expression of dominant values. In the value of "peace and security", narratives about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia represent them as initiators who are persistent in fighting for peace and security. Meanwhile, the Middle East region which has experienced humanitarian conflict in recent years is described as a claimant of peace and security amidst the conflict they are facing. Three other actors are on the opposite side as destroyers of peace and security. This framing is in line with the next value expression, "terrorism and extremism". The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, through various narratives, is framed as an anti-terrorism and anti-extremism country. They condemned the acts of violence that occurred in all countries. Meanwhile, the Middle East region is depicted as a victim of terrorism and extremism carried out by the state and national and transnational militia groups. The Iranian regime is considered responsible for several acts of terrorism and extremists in the Middle East because they are supporters of these acts. Meanwhile, the Houthi and Hezbollah militia groups are described as terrorist and extremist groups.

Victimization-Criminalization

Victimization-criminalization is the main strategy in representing individuals in positive and negative groups. Victimization as a strategy that positions actors as victims elaborates on the unfair treatment received by certain actors. Meanwhile, criminalization as a strategy that positions actors as criminals elaborates on criminal acts carried out by certain actors. In King Salman's speech, victimization was seen in the representation of several Middle Eastern countries as victims of humanitarian conflict. Meanwhile, criminalization can be seen in the representation of the Iranian regime, the Houthi militia,

and Hezbollah as extremists and terrorists who undermine the stability of peace and security in other countries. The list of actors depicted as victims and victims can be seen in Table 9.

Table 9

List of actors represented as victims and criminals

No	Actors	Status	Freq.	Percent.
1	'Yemen' (<i>al-yaman</i>) اليمن	Victim	4	13.4%
2	'Iraq' (<i>al-'irāq</i>) العراق	Victim	2	6.7%
3	'Sudan' (<i>al-sūdān</i>) السودان	Victim	2	6.7%
4	'Egypt' (<i>miṣr</i>) مصر	Victim	2	6.7%
5	'Lebanon' (<i>lubnān</i>) لبنان	Victim	1	3.3%
6	'Afghanistan' (<i>afghānistān</i>) أفغانستان	Victim	1	3.3%
7	'Libia' (<i>lībiya</i>) ليبيا	Victim	1	3.3%
8	'Syria' (<i>sūriyā</i>) سوريا	Victim	1	3.3%
9	'Iranian (al-nizām al-irānī) النظام الإيراني regime'	Criminal	8	26.6%
10	(<i>al-milīthiyah al-ḥūthiyah</i>) الميليشيات الحوثية 'Houthi militia'	Criminal	6	20.0%
11	'Hezbollah' (<i>ḥizbullah</i>) حزب الله	Criminal	2	6.7%
Total			30	100%

Based on the data in Table 9, the criminalization strategy is more widely used than victimization. Criminalization was found in 16 data (53.4%), while victimization was found in 14 data (46.6%). King Salman consistently puts the Iranian regime, the Houthi militia, and Hezbollah in a negative position through criminalization. In direct proportion to this representation, eight Middle Eastern countries are in a neutral position regarding victimization. Among the forms of use of victimization-criminalization strategies can be seen in data B.27 and A.28 below.

B.27 وتستخدم ميليشيات الحوثية معاناة الشعب اليمني، وحاجته الملحة للمساعدة الإنسانية، والمخاطر الناتجة عن تهالك الناقل صافر، أوراقاً للمساومة والابتزاز.

wa tastakhdimu milīthiyāt al-ḥūthiyah ma'ānah al-sha'b al-yamani, wa ḥājatuhu al-muliḥah li al-musā'adah al-insāniyah, wa al-makhātir al-nātijah 'an tahāluk al-nāqilah ṣāfir, awrāqan li al-musāwamah wa al-ibtizār. (Year 2021. Minutes 8:17-8:38)

'The Houthi militias use the suffering of the Yemeni people, their urgent need for humanitarian assistance, and the risks resulting from the deterioration of the safer tanker as bargaining chips and blackmail.'

A.26 كما يستمر عبر أدواته في استهداف المملكة بالصواريخ الباليستية التي تجاوز عددها ثلاثمائة صاروخ وأكثر من أربعمئة طائرة بدون طيار في انتهاك صارخ لقراري مجلس الأمن 2216 و2231.

kamā yastamirru 'ibr adawātihi fī istihdāf al-mamlakah bi al-ṣawārīkh al-bālistiyah allatī tajāwaza 'adaduha thalāthamiah ṣārūkh wa akthar min arba'imiah ṭāirah bi dūni ṭayyār fī intihāk ṣārīkh li qirāray majlis al-amn 2216 wa 2231. (Year 2020. Minutes 6:29-6:50)

'It also continues, through its tools, to target the Kingdom with ballistic missiles, the number of which has exceeded three hundred missiles and more than four hundred drones, in flagrant violation of Security Council Resolutions 2216 and 2231.'

Data B.27 describes the position of the Yemeni people as victims of criminal acts carried out by the Houthi militia. King Salman mentioned the situation of the Yemeni people through the clauses *...hājatuhu al-muliḥah li al-musā'adah al-insāniyah...* '...their urgent need for humanitarian assistance...' and *...al-makhṭir al-nātijah 'an tahāluk al-nāqilah ṣāfir...* '...the risks resulting from the deterioration of the safer tanker...'. On the other hand, the Houthi militia who closed the route of providing aid made the community's situation a bargaining tool and blackmail (*...awrāqan li al-musāwamah wa al-ibtizār*). Meanwhile, data A.26 shows King Salman's efforts to represent the Iranian regime as a criminal. The regime carried out several crimes that damaged peace and security, including *...istihdāf al-mamlakah bi al-ṣawārīkh al-bālistiyah...* '...targeting the Kingdom with ballistic missiles...' and *...intihāk ṣārikh li qirāray majlis al-amn 2216 wa 2231.* '...in flagrant violation of Security Council Resolutions 2216 and 2231'.

National Self-Glorification

National self-glorification is a strategy for elaborating an actor's positive sides in a more specific form. Through this strategy, discourse producers glorify the actor's strengths in terms of history, principles, culture, traditions, character, values, and so on. Through his speech, King Salman glorified several sides of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The form of glorification is shown in Table 10.

Table 10

List of aspects of national self-glorification

No	Glorification Aspects	Freq.	Percent.
1	Economy	5	13.4%
2	Religion	4	6.7%
3	Politics	2	6.7%
4	Culture	2	6.7%
5	Social	2	3.3%
Total		15	100%

The data in Table 10 shows that two dominant aspects of national pride are glorified in King Salman's speech: economy and religion. The form of glorification of this aspect can be seen in data A.14 and A.6 below.

A.14 حيث قدمت المملكة خلال العقود الثلاثة الماضية أكثر من ستة وثمانين مليار دولار من المساعدات الإنسانية، استفادت منها إحدى وثمانون دولة.

haythu qaddamat al-mamlakah khilāl al-'uqūd al-thalāthah al-māḍiyah akthar min sittah wa thamānīn milyār dūlār min al-musā'adat al-insāniyah, istafādat minhā iḥdā wa thamanūn dawlah.
(Year 2020. Minutes 2:58-3:10)

'Over the past three decades, the Kingdom has provided more than eighty-six billion dollars in humanitarian aid, benefiting eighty-one countries.'

A.7 ندعو فيها إلى التعايش والسلام والاعتدال، والتكاتف بين دول العالم وشعوبها في مواجهة التحديات الإنسانية الاستثنائية المشتركة، التي تواجه عالمنا.

nad'ū fihā ilā al-ta'āyush wa al-salām wa al-i'tidāl, wa al-takātuf bayn duwal al-'ālam wa shu'ūbihā fī muwājahah al-taḥaddiyāt al-insāniyah al-istithnāiyah al-mushtarakah, allatī tuwājihu 'ālamānā
(Year 2020. Minutes 1:06-1:23)

'In our country, we call for coexistence, peace, moderation, and solidarity among the countries and peoples of the world in confronting the exceptional common humanitarian challenges facing our world.'

Data A.14 glorifies the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia as a philanthropic country that has consistently provided humanitarian assistance for more than thirty years. King Salman elaborated on three aspects of this data, namely the consistency of Saudi Arabia as a philanthropic country, the amount of assistance provided, and the number of countries that benefited. Saudi Arabia's consistency is described through the phrase ...*khilāl al-'uqūd al-thalāthah al-māḍiyah...* '...over the past three decades...'. The amount of assistance provided can be seen in the phrase ...*akthar min sittah wa thamānīn milyār dūlār...* '...more than six billion dollars...'. Meanwhile, the number of countries that have benefited is expressed in the phrase ...*istafādat minhā iḥdā wa thamanūn dawlah* '...benefiting eighty-one countries'. Meanwhile, data A.7 glorifies Islamic, Arab, and humanitarian values as the basis for state administration. In the narrative he conveys, these values become the spirit of Saudi Arabia as a country. The humanity values are reflected through the phrase *nad'ū fihā ilā al-ta'āyush wa al-salām wa al-i'tidāl, wa al-takātuf bayn duwal al-'ālam wa shu'ūbihā...* 'In our country, we call for coexistence, peace, moderation, and solidarity among the countries and peoples of the world...'.

From a specific basic discursive strategies perspective, King Salman tends to use the strategy of exposing the positive dimensions of the Saudi Arabian government rather than constructing the positive dimensions of other actors. Despite this, he continues to demonize several actors through the politicization of third-country suffering. King Salman's consistency in giving a negative image to the Iranian regime, the Houthis, and Hezbollah is shown through the narrative of the three actors' bad treatment of Middle Eastern countries. Middle Eastern countries that have suffered from acts of terrorism have been used as media to construct a bad image of the Iranian regime, the Houthis, and Hezbollah. In the context of these findings, the strategy of emphasizing positive things about "us" was carried out to construct Saudi Arabia. The strategy of emphasize negative things about "them" for the Iranian regime, Houthi, and Hezbollah. Strategy to de-emphasize positive things about "them" for Middle Eastern countries experiencing a crisis. The number and percentage of use of each of these strategies is shown in Table 11 below.

Table 11

Basic discursive strategies in King Salman's speeches

No	Strategies	Freq.	Percent.
1	Emphasize Positive Things about 'Us'	129	58.6%

2	Emphasize Negative Things about 'Them'	60	27.3%
3	De-Emphasize Negative Things about 'Us'	0	0.0%
4	De-Emphasize Positive Things about 'Them'	31	14.1%
Total		220	100%

Through the various discursive strategies used, it can be concluded that the general ideology contained in King Salman's speech is "nationalism" and "anti-imperialism". Nationalism is reflected in narratives that favor Saudi Arabia over other countries. King Salman emphasized Saudi Arabia's status as the third country that provided the most humanitarian assistance during the COVID-19 pandemic. He also boasted of the Saudi 2030 vision which emphasizes the green economy dimension which constructs an image as an innovative country and sensitive to environmental issues. The speech also included exposure to the superiority of Saudi Arabia's religious, cultural, and political dimensions. Meanwhile, anti-imperialism can be seen in Saudi Arabia's consistency in condemning and opposing acts of terrorism in several Middle Eastern countries. King Salman emphasized his position on respecting human rights, social justice, and international peace and security. Saudi Arabia opposes narratives of imperialism that have a real negative impact on human interests and welfare.

The ideology of "nationalism" is reflected in King Salman's rhetoric which glorifies the various achievements of the Saudi Arabian government. Several positive characteristics such as tolerance, peace, equality, and innovation are keywords that represent Saudi Arabia as a developed country. In emphasizing the aspect of nationalism, the image of tolerance, peace, and equality in King Salman's speech strengthens the findings of the Al-Khawaldeh et al. (2024) and Khawaldeh & Hatab (2018) which examined the speech of the Jordanian leader, King Abdullah II. This finding is also in line with the results of Ebniya (2020) study which explains that the positive characteristics of Islam are caused by the strong influence of Islam as a state ideology. Meanwhile, one new finding that explains King Salman's ideology of "nationalism" is the effort to shape Saudi Arabia's image as an innovative country. He described Saudi Arabia's 2030 vision which carries the idea of a green economy as a new and original initiative that has not been carried out by other countries.

The ideology of "anti-imperialism" is reflected through discursive strategies that use diplomatic, emotional, and predicative language. King Salman has several times emphasized war against the Iranian regime and the Houthis as a form of anti-imperialism. In line with research by Abdelaal et al. (2015), Khaled (2020), Khalil (2021), and Lafta (2020), King Salman's rhetoric is no different from Obama, Netanyahu, and Trump who also used discursive strategies to justify their violent actions in various countries. The diplomatic, emotional, and predicative language used by King Salman strengthens the findings of Jones (2020), Jones & Clark (2019), and Khaled (2020) regarding the language style of world leaders at the UN GA. In emphasizing his "anti-imperialist" ideology, King Salman made the Iranian regime and the Houthis their common enemies. The involvement of other parties in this discourse strengthens the research findings of Khalil (2021) and Lafta (2020) regarding Obama and Trump's rhetoric which often involves other parties in the discourse, such as Iran, China, and Iraq to divert attention toward America.

The ideologies of “nationalism” and “anti-imperialism” in King Salman's speech are represented as belonging to the state, not individuals. This means that King Salman does not claim attitudes and achievements in his claim but in the name of the Saudi Arabian government. This rhetorical strategy is different from the findings of the studies by Khan et al. (2019, 2020, 2021) and Susilowati & Ulkhasanah (2021) who analyzed Donald Trump's speech. Trump often emphasizes the positive dimensions of himself as a person and constructs power relations between himself and society. This tendency for personal claims was also found in studies of the speeches of Imran Khan (Saad & Jubran, 2020; Yahya, 2020) and Joe Biden (Kadwa & Alshenqeeti, 2020) who on several occasions made their personalities representations of ideology. On the opposite side, King Salman's rhetorical strategy which tends to represent the country is similar to Barack Obama's rhetoric which tends to build national solidarity in his various speeches (Abdelaal et al., 2015; Alemi et al., 2018; Altikriti, 2016; Kazemian & Hashemi, 2014; Williamson, 2015).

Through various rhetorical strategies, King Salman tries to emphasize Saudi Arabia's ideology and power compared to other countries. King Salman carries out discursive practices as a form of political effort that can produce power, as is also done by other leaders revealed in previous studies (Bushell et al., 2017; Matar, 2019; Rahmaida & Cahyono, 2022; Winter, 2020). In the context of the situation of speeches at the UN GA, the study findings also strengthen several previous studies which explain that the UN GA is a momentum for state leaders to expose their power and ideology (Anisimova, 2017; Khaled, 2020; Lafta, 2020). In these political forums, the substance of state leaders' speeches tends to be biased and subjective because they often do not represent actual reality (Mitrani, 2017; Pressman, 2020). However, despite this, the same rhetorical strategy will have the potential to be repeated by state leaders in the future.

Conclusion

This research concludes that the basic discursive strategies and discursive rhetoric used by King Salman represent Saudi Arabia's ideology of "nationalism" and "anti-imperialism". In the momentum of the UN general assembly which was attended by world leaders, King Salman emphasized the ideology and power of his government to increase Saudi Arabia's political bargaining power in global geopolitical dynamics. Thus, the speech he delivered became an instrument for carrying out the strategy and achieving these goals. Although researchers have drawn research conclusions, it cannot be denied that this research has several limitations. The relatively small amount of data narrows the scope of the research conclusions. This means that future researchers have a great opportunity to discover other phenomena through various study perspectives that can enrich or refute the findings of this research. Among several opportunities for this study are political discourse analysis which emphasizes the political context of speech and political metaphor analysis which more specifically discusses metaphorical meaning in the political speech.

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